War is the Economy
What we think we get when we get war.
We are launching a new issue focused on grasping the extent and the history of U.S. foreign intervention — how does the U.S. conceive of its role in the world, what has it done to maintain that role, and what has or hasn’t changed over time. A new foreign policy consensus seems to be rapidly emerging, and, per usual, the most helpful thing to do is to slow down and try to understand the context of the moment we are in. Today, we start a new series of long-form interviews with the experts — historians, analysts, NGO leaders, etc.
This interview with Michael Brenes was conducted and condensed by franknews. You can read more from on his Substack here.
Do you mind introducing yourself?
I'm the co-director of the Brady Johnson Program in Grand Strategy at Yale. I also teach in the history department at Yale. I work broadly on the relationship between domestic politics in the United States and US foreign policy. I've been interested in the interrelationship between domestic politics and foreign policy for quite some time. But, if I had to point to a particular date, I would say around the Obama presidency in 2008-2009, I started getting interested in why the right was mobilizing against Obama and his healthcare policy, talking about big government and why big government was such a threat to the United States when Republicans favored a large, standing military–one of the largest features of the federal government. Why did Americans become okay with the billions we spend on the military budget and the deployment of American power abroad if they have such hostility to “big-government?”
I thought the contradiction or tension between those two things was quite interesting, and that became the genesis of my PhD dissertation, which became my first book. Since publishing that book, I've turned to other topics. I published a book in January on great power competition and why that's bad for democracy, both at home and abroad. That book is called "The Rivalry Peril: How Great Power Competition Threatens Peace and Weakens Democracy." I co-wrote that with Van Jackson, who's a political scientist. I'm also currently working on a history of the War on Terror, to be published by Grove Atlantic, examining US foreign policy and how it relates to domestic politics at home — from the 1990s to the present.
I'm curious to dive into your first book's answer. What did you find to be the relationship between defense spending and social welfare spending?
What I found was that in the early years of the Cold War, there was this idea that the United States had to prioritize threats abroad as opposed to threats at home. When we were dealing with threats at home, whether they came in the form of poverty, healthcare crises, or racial inequality—various social issues that we're still confronting today—policymakers opposed to confronting these threats argued the United States does not have enough money to deal with these problems. The right often mobilized against the expansion of the welfare state in these terms. The Democrats, to counter the Republican party and this anti-government ethos, would say that if we don't deal with threats at home, we can't deal with threats abroad.
Democrats then tied defense spending and military spending to social welfare spending, thinking that we could do both. They thought the defense industry, a permanent military industry, could create jobs, create growth, bring employment to areas of the country that needed it, and that it could provide good jobs—many times unionized jobs—and therefore allow people to purchase homes and enjoy the “American Dream”. What I found was that over time, when you get into the sixties and seventies, when the Republicans had come to power in government in greater numbers, the GOP revived its arguments from the early Cold War, saying the United States does not need to confront issues of injustice anymore—these problems had been solved. We don't need a social welfare state to defeat the problems at home— having one exceeded the authority of the federal government. Instead, we need to focus our priorities abroad.
By the 1970s, the Democrats had also expressed a growing skepticism of “big-government,” as they increasingly felt the private market could solve social inequalities. Neoliberalism took hold over both political parties, as policymakers began to rely on the private sector rather than the public sector to generate jobs on a large scale. This coincided with a renewed faith in American military power, with a demand to increase military spending after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. By the 1980s, U.S. defense spending was still creating jobs and growth, but for the few rather than the many, as the defense industry outsourced jobs and eliminated much of its blue-collar workforce.
The overall problem, I concluded, was that Cold War military spending created and furthered inequality in the United States. The privatization and the militarization of the American economy was bad for workers, bad for Americans in and outside of the defense industry. Until we reconcile the tension between social welfare and defense spending in American politics, until we stop relying on military spending to create jobs, we'll never truly be able to deal with problems at home—racial inequality, healthcare, poverty, and so forth.
What is the mechanism then that leads to inequality?
Defense spending creates jobs for a particular sector of the workforce. It creates jobs for the highly educated, those who are in fields such as engineering and science (STEM), people who need PhDs and master's degrees. To have an entry-level job in the defense industry now, you need at least an associate's degree. When we're talking about creating jobs for Americans, it's not like during the New Deal or what we saw during the Great Depression where Roosevelt sought to create jobs for people building parks and bridges. Defense spending outside of a total war (such as World War II) cannot create full employment on a scale that would be beneficial for both wealthy and poor Americans.
Indeed, the idea that defense spending is a boon to the economy is quite misplaced. Research done by places like the Cost of War project at Brown University shows that if you took the amount of money put into defense spending and reallocated it towards healthcare or education, you'd actually get a greater return on your investment, both in terms of jobs and outcomes. You actually provide a social good with those monies, as opposed to defense spending, which creates jobs for a few people. You end up producing missiles and technology that can serve certain purposes, but not broad purposes. Ultimately, you're building weapons—a destructive project end—and the economic conditions you're creating further inequality.
You mention Roosevelt and the New Deal programs, can you explain how these played a role in laying the groundwork for where we are today?
In the 1930s, Roosevelt looked to the Navy to create jobs during the Great Depression. He had an agenda of putting people to work—that's why he got elected. But he turned to the Navy to build shipyards and military infrastructure. Looking at the New Deal and how he justified it rhetorically, he said we should treat this time of history–the Great Depression–as if we're in a period of war. That's also how he justified the New Deal to people who might be skeptical of big government and government intervention in the economy.
You combine those two things—the material effects of the New Deal relying upon the military and defense contractors to create jobs, and the rhetoric behind that—and the New Deal, I believe, provided the context for the defense jobs created during the Second World War. The mass unemployment we saw during the Great Depression was over in a couple of years because of wartime production. Unemployment dropped to about 4% by 1945; we essentially had a full employment economy.
The logic at the end of the war was that both the New Deal and New Deal agencies, which in many ways were precursors for the wartime agencies, showed that the military could create mass employment and bring people jobs on a large scale. That logic and material outcome informed post-war policymakers, including President Truman, when they started to think about how the military could serve a social good by creating jobs and growth in communities around the United States.
Can you define what the military-industrial complex is?
The military-industrial complex is an interrelationship between private defense contractors, the US government—particularly Congress and the presidency—and the ideas that have shaped US foreign policy after 1945. It represents this interaction between private industry and government as it relates to the need for military spending to deter and defeat what the United States perceives as existential threats to its national security. These threats have evolved over time. In the Cold War, it was the Soviet Union and communism. When the Soviet Union fell in 1991, the military-industrial complex didn't go away. Terrorism became the new threat after 9/11. We needed a permanent weapons industry to deter acts of terrorism and defeat terrorist organizations, argued members of the national security establishment. Now the predominant threat is China, as policymakers claim that China represents an existential threat to global freedom. As new threats present themselves, the industry is malleable and adapts, aligning itself with a new ideology and fears of new threats to ensure its survivability and growth. But the pillars of the complex–the relationship between private defense contractors and the federal government–remain.
Particularly with this election, there seems to be a bit of a divergence on foreign policy consensus. I'm curious to understand how you saw it working then and how that compares to today.
The assumptions that play into why the United States needs a permanent military industry date to the early Cold War. They are bipartisan as well. Those assumptions are that the United States and its allies face an overarching threat from communism and communist governments in countries like the Soviet Union. Policymakers in the 1940s and 1950s wanted to ensure that the Soviet Union–an authoritarian country that appears expansionist–does not turn into another Germany. They feared Joseph Stalin would become another Hitler. Totalitarian countries ultimately become imperialist countries, they felt. The United States therefore needed to provide a bulwark against totalitarianism. The U.S. had to save democracies from autocracy. This could only be done through military preparedness.
These assumptions are reflected in the rhetoric and policies of both the GOP and the Democratic Party. The differences lie in the policies that emerge from this logic.
The Democrats were more hawkish than the Republicans in the forties and fifties. They advocated for universal military training, creating a peacetime draft, developing military bases around the world, and building up our peacetime forces. The Republicans at that time were skeptical of government in all its forms, led by people like Senator Robert Taft from Ohio. They said we don't need a permanent peacetime draft, but we do need a large Air Force. Their assumption was that air power would eliminate the need to deploy ground forces as we did during World War II. Republicans believed having a large Air Force meant we wouldn't have to send people into countries to invade them—the Air Force could be the crux of the modern military, from the U.S. suffering mass casualties on the battlefield. But, Republicans still believed the United States needed to build up its military forces..
Things started to shift by the seventies when the Democrats, after Vietnam, became more skeptical of American power. They started to think critically about what the Cold War meant for the future of the world and the United States. So-called “doves” started to get elected in the Democratic Party. These Democrats, many of them in Congress, felt Vietnam had taught the United States a lesson: that its power was not infinite, that it could not defeat communism everywhere, that it had to be skeptical of sending Americans into combat. In contrast, the Republicans became more hawkish, saying the U.S. needed to maintain “peace through strength” during the presidency of Ronald Reagan.
The slogan of “peace through strength” has reemerged during Trump’s second term. But you're also starting to see another shift where the GOP is critical of American power in certain forms (sending arms to Ukraine) and uncritical of it in others (toward China, for instance). Trump isn't skeptical of using military power against China or using military power to assassinate leaders, as we saw during Trump's first presidency with [Iranian General Qasem] Soleimani. They're skeptical of permanent wars, whether in Afghanistan, Ukraine, and to a certain extent in Syria. (JD Vance tweeted recently saying the United States doesn't have a role to play in the situation in Syria.)
Meanwhile, the former vice president Kamala Harris campaigned with Liz Cheney (a Republican hawk) during the 2024 campaign, arguing that Trump's presidency would lead to a decline in American power, that Harris would ensure that the United States remains “the most lethal fighting force.” The Democrats are trying to maintain America’s hegemonic position in the world by embracing great-power competition against China, thinking we can save democracy in Ukraine, and that we can keep supplying weapons to Israel. This means the United States is committed, from the Democrats' perspective, to a series of conflicts and wars that have no end in sight. The Republicans are also committed to American military dominance–they also welcome great-power competition– but with skepticism about any conflict or alliance that does not enhance U.S. military might, as they see it.
I'm skeptical of Republicans giving up any military power, as you mentioned, but they do seem to have captured a population that is skeptical of defense spending. How do you see the shift in the public perception of defense spending? Did they find it to be an effective social program in the World War II era?
During World War II, many Americans saw the defense industry as creating jobs when they had few during the Great Depression. The war becomes the economy – that is the situation in WWII. Now it's fundamentally changed. Many Americans don't think of defense spending as a great generator of jobs anymore. They don’t think of it playing a role in creating full employment, or think of it as leading to a better life–a better job, better pay. This is not the case with people who are affected by the industry on a daily basis–who are employed by it, or whose communities rely upon defense contracts–but most of the country today, I would argue.
Americans are critical and have been critical for many years of the United States committing itself to conflicts for long periods of time, whether that's Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Ukraine. When a conflict breaks out, there's a rally-around-the-flag moment, a sense that the United States can be a force for good. But looking at history, the American people have always been skeptical of voting for the wartime candidate unless we're in a period of war.
Again, Americans don’t like protracted wars. Over time, once these conflicts drag on, Americans start to complain, they start to worry what is in it for them. Do these wars improve their lives? Does a war in Afghanistan, or sending arms to Ukraine make my life better? They start to think, rightfully so, why are we committing all this money when the end game isn't apparent.
We saw this during the 2020 election when American people were skeptical of committing more troops and money to Afghanistan. We're seeing it with Ukraine now. The idea that we are spending untold amounts of money on a conflict with no end in sight makes people rightfully think, "What's in it for me? This seems to elude people in the Democratic party who think the American people want someone to wield military power without restraint. That hasn't proven true in American politics, certainly not in the past two elections.
I think a similar phenomenon can be applied to how Americans view defense spending. If they see that defense spending benefits them personally, they are for it, if not, or if what the U.S. is spending money on seems contrary to their interests, they become critical of it.
I know you are a historian and not a political strategist, but do you have an idea of what an effective strategy would be for Democrats? And I'm curious if you think they'll ever actually give up this Cold War consensus, or if this is something too enmeshed in industry.
The Democratic Party needs to stop embracing Liz Cheney and figures like her. That fundamentally backfired on Kamala Harris, and if they do it again in 2028, they will lose again. Liz Cheney does not get you a winning coalition. If I were the Democratic Party, I would listen to the American people, what the polls say, and why people are voting for Trump. I would be much more receptive to public opinion and sensitivities regarding the United States getting involved in a potential war with China, or a long-term conflict with Israel, given many Americans wanted the U.S. to stop sending arms to Israel without conditions during the war in Gaza.
All the incentives in Washington DC, including among Democrats, make competition with China an enduring feature of the national security establishment. Many Democratic policy makers believe the United States can commit itself to various conflicts around the world and pursue primacy indefinitely. All the ideological and financial incentives support believing these things—believing that the United States is in a “new Cold War” with China, that we can do more to deter and constrain China, that a “new Cold War” is winnable. Even though many Democrats reject the idea that we're in a new Cold War, they still believe we are in some long-term competition with China. To get a job in the national security state requires believing these things.
But I think this needs to fundamentally change if Democrats want the presidency in 2028. Most Americans don’t want an unending conflict with China waged through tariffs and export controls, which arguably means higher prices and fewer jobs for Americans. These aren't original ideas—many people said them after Kamala Harris's defeat. But the Democratic Party needs to stop listening to consultants and inside-the-Beltway voices, and start reforming how it treats and interacts with the American people on foreign policy and domestic policy issues. This means eschewing great-power competition with China and rejecting the idea that the Chinese are an existential threat to the United States. The American people are skeptical of and concerned about China, but they don't want to see the United States go to war over Taiwan or be involved in an amphibious conflict in the South China Sea. The Democrats will keep losing, not just on domestic policy but on foreign policy, until they recognize that their thinking reflects a few people and not the majority.
When you say the financial incentives are aligned to continue to believe that, did you mean on a personal level, like to get a job?
Correct. On a personal level, to reject what the establishment believes about American power, about great-power competition with China, would mean you're not welcomed in this small group of people. You're persona non grata.
And is there a world without a military-industrial complex, or are you always going to need private companies who will then probably lobby you in a country like America and continue to have aligned financial incentives?
I think there will always be private defense industries. National security threats existed prior to 1941, and private industry was around and built weapons then. The problem with the current military-industrial complex is that it's building superfluous weapons and things we don't need. Congress supports this, which is why it continues. The industry is making weapons that even the military says we don't need, whether that's the Littoral Combat Ship or the Abrams tank.
There's great bloat within the industry. A more appropriate military-industrial complex would operate exclusively in wartime and produce things that meet the national security needs and interests of the United States. I don’t think we will go back to a time when there was no standing army or military presence. But we must streamline the operations of the military-industrial complex and make it more effective and responsive.
As a brief example, with Ukraine, they were asking for ammunition, Javelin missiles, and very basic weapons during the first months of the war, and the United States couldn't supply them. We had ammunition shortages and Javelin missile shortages within our defense industrial base. The companies themselves said they didn't have the labor or material to produce the amount of weapons that Ukraine wanted. I believe and continue to believe Ukraine is a war that the United States should be supporting in terms of supplying weapons. But what we saw for the first few months, and even now, is that the United States isn't in a position to sufficiently help Ukraine, to help the country fend off Russian aggression. That's a reflection of the inefficiencies within the defense industry. A better military-industrial complex would be more responsive to the concerns of our partners and allies, and not produce things that waste taxpayer dollars and are counterproductive to the security needs of the United States and its allies.
And where can we make it more responsive? Does that rely on Congress becoming more informed? Where can we sort of push for those efficiencies?
I think it does depend on a Congress that's more assertive in regulating the industry. Congress has not been as aggressive as it needs to be in reining in the worst excesses of the industry. The largest companies , the big five companies - including Lockheed, Boeing, Raytheon - those companies have been allowed to function with greater impunity over the past couple decades. Congress needs to take greater measures to regulate them, to step in and break up monopolies when they exist and stop these companies from producing massive cost overruns. I also think it's a situation where we need to have the public be more informed about what's happening with the tax dollars that are being used in their name. But it first starts with reforming defense procurement, reforming how the Pentagon does business with these companies. On that point, the Pentagon hasn't passed an audit, ever.
I do think that there are people within the Pentagon who realize that things need to change, but change cannot come within the Department of Defense alone. If change does come internally, great, but I just don’t think that will happen. Congress needs to ensure that the Pentagon is more streamlined in its processes to the point that it can actually pass an audit. I think this is a key point: we don't actually know where money's going. This all goes back to the relationship between foreign policy and domestic politics. If we don't know where the money's going, and if the evidence is that it's being used for destructive, counterproductive purposes, that's a strain on the health of American democracy.
So do you think DOGE is going to fix it…
<Laughs> No, I do not. I have no faith in Elon Musk or his acolytes. They're not going to fix a thing.
Me neither. Okay. Well this has been very clarifying and very helpful.